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The U.S. Encryption Export Policy: Taking the
Byte Out of the Debate
Mai-Trfim B. Dinh
Today, the Internet is one of the fastest-growing vehicles for
commerce. With billions of dollars at stake, it is not surprising
that any controversy concerning Internet commerce will elicit
heated debate from interested parties. The U.S. encryption ex-
port policy has been no exception. The government has imposed
restrictions on the export of encryption software, with the goal of
safeguarding national security. The Clinton administration has
instituted the policy over the objection of encryption software de-
velopers, who argue that its restraints will hamper their ability
to compete in the international market.
This Note argues that while the U.S. encryption export pol-
icy may not be ideal, no alternative achieves a better balance of
interests in privacy, economic growth, and national security.
Section I explains the background of the Internet as a vehicle for
electronic commerce (e-commerce) and outlines the U.S. policy
statement concerning e-commerce. Section II describes the U.S.
encryption export policy. Section III sets forth the effects of en-
cryption technology on e-commerce and analyzes the export pol-
icy in the context of the United States' stated goals. Finally,
Section IV explains why criticism of the current policy is
unwarranted.
I. ENCRYPTION REGULATION ON THE INFORMATION
SUPERHIGHWAY
Before discussing the details of the U.S. encryption export
policy, it is essential to understand the advent of the "informa-
tion superhighway" and the Internet's role in commerce. It is
also important to explain encryption technology and the history
of its regulation.
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A. THE "INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY"
The Internet consists of a world-wide network of com-
puters.' In 1969, the U.S. government established the first com-
puter network, ARPANET, as a Department of Defense
initiative to link important research and command sites.2 The
Internet, which evolved out of ARPANET, is a collection of more
than 10,000 independent computer networks spanning more
than fifty countries.3 The Internet has no central control be-
cause it was designed to maintain a means of communication
between incompatible computer systems in the event of a cata-
strophic attack.4 Although it has since outgrown its military
roots, this decentralized structure is still a key feature of the
Internet.
President Clinton has hailed the Internet as an innovation
that "has done more to shape and create the world our children
will inherit than virtually any invention since the printing
press."5 He has predicted that within a generation, entire collec-
tions of books, symphonies, movies, and art will be within every
child's reach on home or school computer screens, thereby revo-
lutionizing education. 6
The Internet is already changing the way American compa-
nies do business. Trade on the Internet is doubling or tripling
every year, and projections only a few years into the future sug-
gest that it will generate hundreds of billions of dollars of trade
in goods and services 7 and help "fuel economic growth well into
the 21st century."8 One analyst predicts that financial transac-
1. See generally, e.g., ED KROL, THE WHOLE INTERNET USER'S GUIDE AND
CATALOG 13-21 (2d ed. 1994); HARLEY HAHN & RICK STOUT, THE INTERNET COM-
PLETE REFERENCE 1-2 (1994).
2. See KROL, supra note 1, at 13. The acronym ARPANET stands for the
network developed by the Department of Defense's Advanced Research Project
Agency. See Andrew Grosso, The National Information Infrastructure, 41 FED.
BAR NEWS & J. 481, 481 (1994). The Defense Advanced Research Project
Agency oversaw the administration of the Internet until 1983. See Gary Chap-
man, Is the Internet a Matter of National Security?, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1997,
at D6.
3. See generally KATIE HAFNER & MATTHEW LYON, WHERE WIZARDS STAY
Up LATE (1996).
4. See KROL, supra note 1, at 13; Chapman, supra note 2, at D6.
5. Remarks Announcing the Electronic Commerce Initiative, 33 WEEKLY
COMP. PREs. DOc. 1003, at 1004 (July 1, 1997).
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. Memorandum on Electronic Commerce, 33 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
1006, at 1007 (July 1, 1997).
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tions on the Internet could foster the growth of electronic com-
merce from $3 billion in 1997 to $1 trillion by 2010. 9
The Internet presents great opportunities to small and large
businesses alike. Companies of all sizes find the low operating
costs and access to millions of consumers around the world at-
tractive. Entrepreneurs can start businesses more easily and
access a worldwide network of potential customers without a
large amount of capital. 10 The Internet is expected to revolu-
tionize retailing by allowing consumers to shop from home for a
wide variety of products and services, offered by sellers world-
wide and around-the-clock"- and to change business practices
by allowing companies to operate more efficiently both inter-
nally and with suppliers and customers.' 2 The number of me-
dium-sized and large companies using e-commerce "will grow by
more than 50% [in 1998,1 to include nearly two-thirds of U.S.
companies.' 3 Currently, an estimated 35 million consumers
and 190,000 businesses are connected to the Internet. 14 Most
forecasters predict that by the year 2000, hundreds of millions of
people worldwide will use the Internet.' 5
9. See Online Payments Gain Appeal, INTERNET MAG., Oct. 1997, at 29.
10. See THE WHITE HOUSE, A FRAMEWORK FOR GLOBAL ELECTRONIC COM-
MERCE, at 2 (July 1, 1997). [hereinafter FRAMEWORK]. This document is avail-
able in book form and also at <http://www.iitf.nist.gov/eleccomm/ecomm.htm>.
11. See id.; see also David Baum, Fast Track to E-Commerce, ORACLE MAG-
AZiNE, JanlFeb. 1998, at 46, 48.
12. See Memorandum on Electronic Commerce, supra note 8, at 1007.
13. Clinton Wilder, E-Commerce Gains Support as Companies Watch Prof-
its, INFORMATIONWEEK, Dec. 1, 1997, at 32.
14. See Craig W. Harding, Selected Issues in Electronic Commerce: New
Technologies and Legal Paradigms, in DOING BUSINESS ON THE INTERNET 7, 9
(Practising Law Institute ed., 1997).
15. Estimates of the number of future Internet users vary significantly.
See, e.g., Kara Swisher, There's No Place Like a Home Page, WASH. POST, July 1,
1996, at Al (52 million); John Zarocostas, Limitations of Statutes, J. COMM,
May 14, 1997, at 1C (90-120 million); James Champy, et al., Creating the Elec-
tronic Community, INFORMATIONWEEK, June 10, 1996, at 57, 64 (170 million);
Camille DeMarzo, Year in Review, COMPUTER RESELLER NEWS, Nov. 18, 1996, at
267, 278 (300 million); Fraud on the Internet: Statement Before the Permanent
Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Government Affairs, Feb.
10, 1998, available in 1998 WL 51659 (F.D.C.H.) (1998) (statement of Sen. Su-
san M. Collins) (500 million); Mary Hayes, Working Online, Or Wasting Time?,
INFORMATIONWEEK, May 1, 1995, at 38, 44 (700 million). The explanation for
the disparity in estimates may lie in how "Internet use" is defined: one study
measuring "true, actual Internet use, not simply e-mail use or potential In-
ternet access," resulted in an estimate of 25.4 million users by 2000. Find/SVP
Estimates 9.5 Million "True" Internet Users, NEWSBYTES, June 11, 1996, avail-
able in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File.
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Digitized information on the Internet includes on-line copies
of computer programs, information sources, literature, videos,
and music. 16 A retail consumer may search the Internet for the
information he or she seeks, pay for it using electronic cash,17
and then download it onto his or her computer. Other busi-
nesses which are proliferating on the Internet include those in
the fields of information, financial, and technical services; pro-
fessional consulting; educational ventures; medical diagnostics;
and advertising.' 8 The types of goods and services that can be
bought and sold electronically are essentially unlimited.
As businesses and consumers participate in the electronic
marketplace, they are developing new forms of commercial in-
teraction which are modifying traditional business and economic
practices.' 9 The transfer of digitized information through the
Internet raises trade issues that are unique to electronic com-
merce. Because the Internet is composed of independent com-
puter networks which have no central control, 20 it is difficult to
regulate. Additionally, while some Internet transactions are
readily compared to non-electronic transactions, 21 the transfer
of digitized information has no easily discernible parallel in the
non-electronic realm. Thus, regulatory frameworks established
for telecommunications, radio, and television may not fit the
needs of the Internet or our "new electronic age."22 As one Euro-
pean commissioner has said, "[iut is ironic, but the possibilities of
the Internet make it impossible to regulate."23
16. See James D. Cigler & Susan E. Stinnett, Treasury Seeks Cybertax An-
swers with Electronic Commerce Discussion Paper, 8 J. IN'L TAX'N 56, 61 (Feb.
1997). See generally, e.g., Visa Shopping Guide (visited Mar. 10, 1998), <http:ll
shopguide.yahoo.com>; Excite Shopping (visited Mar. 10, 1998), <http://www.
excite.con/channel/shopping>.
17. Electronic cash (e-cash) is used by on-line banks and consumers as a
currency that can be electronically negotiated for goods and services. See David
Post, E-Cash: Can't Live With It, Can't Live Without It, AM. LAW., Mar. 1995, at
116, 116 (describing e-cash as "digital tokens accepted as the equivalent of legal
tender"). E-cash is made secure through the use of encryption technology,
which can prevent forgery and protect consumer privacy. See id.
18. See Memorandum on Electronic Commerce, supra note 8, at 1007.
19. See FRAMEWORK, supra note 10, at 2.
20. See supra text accompanying note 4.
21. For example, product orders placed on the Internet can be analogized
to orders placed by mail or telephone.
22. FRAMEWORK, supra note 10, at 5.
23. Matthew Slater, Europeans Clash with U.S. over Encryption,
TECHWIRE, Oct. 9, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File.
378 [Vol. 7:375
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B. ENCRYPTION 24
In order for electronic commerce to develop to its full eco-
nomic potential, consumers and businesses must be assured
that their communications will not be intercepted or modified. 25
Additionally, businesses want to avoid the release of confidential
information to their competitors. 26 Encryption technology
makes the achievement of these goals possible. Encryption
software applies a mathematical function, called an algorithm,
to scramble e-mail messages, computer files, telephone conver-
sations, and other data to render them unreadable by unin-
tended recipients such as spies and thieves.27 Encryption
products protect the confidentiality of electronically transmitted
or stored data and communications by "converting plain text
into cipher text, an unreadable string of numbers and letters."28
The algorithm which is used to unscramble, or decrypt, the
message is called a decryption key.2 9
The strength of an encryption algorithm depends on the
length of its key, which is measured in bits, and the complexity
of the algorithm. 30 Each bit doubles the number of possible key
sequences; thus, as the number of bits increases, the encryption
becomes dramatically stronger. 31 For example, a 40-bit key per-
mits more than a trillion possible combinations, while a 56-bit
24. This Note offers only a basic discussion of encryption. For more
comprehensive background material on the subject, see e.g., Adam C. Bonin,
Protecting Protection: First and Fifth Amendment Challenges to Cryptography
Regulation, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 495; A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor is
the Key: Cryptography, the Clipper Chip, and the Constitution, 143 U. PA. L.
REV. 709 (1995); and Thinh Nguyen, Note, Cryptography, Export Controls, and
the First Amendment in Bernstein v. United States Department of State, 10
HARV. J. LAW & TECH. 667 (1997).
25. See Charles R. Merrill, Proof of WHO, WHAT, and WHEN in Electronic
Commerce Under the Digital Signature Guidelines, in DOING BUSINESS ON THE
INTERNET 133, supra note 14, at 136.
26. See Bradley D. Brown, Securing Transactions in Network Applications,
ORACLE MAG., Jan/Feb. 1998, at 91, 91.
27. See Willie Schatz, The Government Eyes Encryption, INFORMA-
TIONWEEK, Sept. 8, 1997, at 60; see also Stewart A. Baker, Decoding the OECD's
Guidelines for Cryptography Policy, in DOING BUSINESS ON THE INTERNET 265,
supra note 14, at 267.
28. Wendy R. Leibowitz, Battle over Encryption Export Flares, NAT'L L.J.,
Sept. 29, 1997, at Al; see also Baker, supra note 27, at 267.
29. See Baker, supra note 27, at 267.
30. See id.
31. See COMPUTER SCIENCE AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS BOARD, NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL, CRYPTOGRAPHY'S ROLE IN SECURING THE INFORMATION SOCI-
ETY 63 (Kenneth W. Dam & Herbert S. Lin eds., 1996) [hereinafter NRC
REPORT].
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key permits more than 72 quadrillion possible combinations. 32
Longer keys complicate a brute-force decoding attack, which re-
lies on trial and error.33 More complex algorithms hamper
mathematical attacks and thus require differential crypt-
analysis.34
Encryption is used for three primary reasons: "to ensure the
confidentiality of data, [to] authenticate data, and to ensure its
integrity."35 Encryption ensures the confidentiality of data by
preventing computer users other than the proper recipient from
decoding the message.36 It authenticates data by allowing a re-
cipient to confirm that a particular sender transmitted the com-
munication-usually by the use of a digital signature.37
Authentication can confirm that the message was not a forgery;
it can also be used to prevent the sender from later denying that
he or she actually sent the message.38 Encryption ensures data
integrity by allowing a recipient to confirm that the message
was not altered in transit.39
With the "key escrow" system, also known as "key recov-
ery,"40 independent "trusted" third parties41 hold encryption key
32. See Peter Coffee, No Crypto Is Too Tough to Crack, PC WEEK, Sept. 29,
1997, at 16, 16.
33. See id.
34. See id. "Differential cryptanalysis compares differences between en-
crypted files against differences between their plain-text fies." Id.
35. Baker, supra note 27, at 267.
36. See id.
37. See id. at 268. Digital signing is usually accomplished when a signer
"encrypts the information with his or her private key, thereby 'signing' the doc-
ument." Id.
38. See id.
39. See id. This is achieved through the use of hash functions, which re-
duce the length of the information and thereby produce a condensed "message
digest." The sender encrypts and sends both the original message and the
message digest. The receiver then applies the same hashing algorithm to the
received text to create a second message digest. If the second digest matches
the original digest, then the recipient knows that the message was not altered.
See id.
40. See Harding, supra note 14, at 14. See also infra text accompanying
notes 85-92.
41. Examples of trusted third parties-also known as key recovery
agents-include private companies, banks, or other commercial or government
entities that meet statutory criteria for trustworthiness. The Impact of Encryp-
tion on Public Safety: Statement Before the Subcomm. on Technology, Terror-
ism, and Government Information of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th
Cong. (Sept. 3, 1997) (statement of Louis J. Freeh, Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation) [hereinafter Impact of Encryption Statement]. A key recovery
agent must certify that individuals who will have access to keys are suitable
and trustworthy, as indicated by having no record of criminal convictions or
pending criminal charges, never having breached any fiduciary responsibilities,
[Vol. 7:375380
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codes on all encryption software shipped internationally. 42
These outside parties can use the keys to decode messages for
law enforcement agencies if the government suspects illegal ac-
tivities and obtains court approval to execute a wiretap.43
C. ENCRYPTION REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES
Until recently, the Department of State regulated encryp-
tion technology as a munition.44 At the end of 1996, in recogni-
tion of its value in legitimate commercial and communications
contexts and to simplify and accelerate the licensing procedure,
jurisdiction for licensing of encryption exports was transferred
to the Department of Commerce. 45 The Department of Com-
merce, pursuant to the Export Administration Act 46 and the Ex-
port Administration Regulations (EAR),47 now regulates the
export of all commercial encryption products.48
and having a favorable credit record; an active U.S. government security clear-
ance at the Secret level or higher, issued or updated within the last five years,
will also suffice. See Key Escrow or Key Recovery Agent Criteria, Security Poli-
cies, and Key Escrow or Key Recovery Procedures, 15 C.F.R. § 742, Supp. 5
(1997). The key recovery agent itself must submit evidence of its viability and
economic security through documents such as a certificate of good standing
from the state of incorporation, credit reports, and errors/omissions insurance.
See id. An agent must also disclose whether any of the following have occurred
within the ten years prior to the application: a felony conviction of the business,
a material adverse civil fraud judgment or settlement, or a debarment from
government contracting. See id.
42. See Charlotte Dunlap, Global Web Policy Nets Some Support, COM-
PUTER RESELLER NEWS, Sept. 15, 1997, at 34, 34.
43. See Geoffrey R. Greiveldinger, Digital Telephony and Key-Escrow En-
cryption Initiatives: A Critical Juncture as Law Enforcement Agencies Work to
Save Electronic Surveillance, 41 FED. B. NEWS & J. 505, 508 (Aug. 1994).
44. See Exec. Order No. 13,026, 61 Fed. Reg. 58,767 (1996) (Administration
of Export Controls on Encryption Products); see also United States Munitions
List, 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 (1997); 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (1994) (prescribing administra-
tion of the United States Munitions List).
45. See Exec. Order No. 13,026, supra note 44; Encryption Export Policy
Presidential Press Release (Nov. 15, 1996), available at <http'J/www.
bxa.doc.gov/m961115.htm> [hereinafter Encryption Press Release]; see also
David Aaron, U.S. Special Envoy for Cryptography, International Views of Key
Recovery, Comments at RSA Data Security Conference (Jan. 28, 1997), avail-
able at <http'//www.bxa.doc.gov/aaron.htm>.
46. Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420 (1994)).
47. 15 C.F.R. §§ 730-74 (1997).
48. See Harding, supra note 14, at 14; see also Encryption Press Release,
supra note 45; United States Munitions List, 22 C.F.R. § 121.1, Category
XIII(b) (1997).
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Although Americans can use any encryption system domes-
tically,49 in 1996 President Clinton announced a qualified ban
on the export of strong encryption which prevents law enforce-
ment agencies from accessing plain-text versions of the
messages and data sent over the Internet.50 The government's
primary concern is that the use of encryption outside the United
States will threaten U.S. foreign policy and national security
objectives. 51 The detection and prosecution of criminals such as
terrorists and drug traffickers is hindered when they employ
data-scrambling technology to mask their activities. 52 From
1995 to 1996, the number of instances in which criminals' use of
encryption frustrated the Federal Bureau of Investigation's
(FBI) court-authorized electronic surveillance efforts increased
more than two-fold.5 3 Additionally, recent international terror-
ism attacks display a "trend toward . . . large-scale incidents
designed for maximum destruction, terror, and media impact,"
thereby placing more Americans at risk, both at home and
abroad. 54
While domestic law enforcement agencies also harbor con-
cerns about the use of encryption to conceal criminal activity,
the Clinton administration has drafted the encryption export re-
strictions primarily with an eye to foreign policy; the restrictions
are intended to protect the United States against national secur-
ity threats.55 The profound effect of encryption regulation on
U.S. international competitiveness, the growth of global elec-
tronic commerce, and the privacy of data and communications in
49. See Aaron, supra note 45.
50. Exec. Order No. 13,026, supra note 44. "Strong" encryption software
refers to programs with key lengths of more than 40 bits. See William A.
Hodkowski, The Future of Internet Security: How High Technologies Will Shape
the Internet and Affect the Law, 13 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.
217, 234 (1997). The Data Encryption Standard (DES), now widely used,
utilizes a 56-bit key. See id.
51. See Encryption Press Release, supra note 45.
52. See Paula Rooney, Gore Tells SPA Attendees Not to Expect Change to
U.S. Encryption Export Policy, COMPUTER RETAIL WEEK, Sept. 15, 1997, at 2, 2.
53. See World Wide Threats to U.S. National Security: Hearing Before the
Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence, 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of Louis J.
Freeh, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation), available at 1998 WL
8991513 [hereinafter World Wide Threats Hearing]. The number of instances
increased from five to twelve. See id.
54. Id.
55. See generally Encryption Press Release, supra note 45. The U.S. na-
tional security concerns include the protection of U.S. citizens in the United
States and abroad, as well as the safety of citizens of other countries. See id.
382 [Vol. 7:375
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business and personal contexts influenced the narrow tailoring
of the encryption restrictions. 56
D. PRINCIPLES OF THE U.S. FRAMEWORK FOR GLOBAL
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE
On July 22, 1994, representatives from the United States
and the Russian Federation signed a Memorandum of Under-
standing on the Global Information Infrastructure (GII) Initia-
tive.57 One of its goals was the formation of a "mutual exchange
and sharing of information on objectives and priorities" for de-
veloping information superhighways. 58 The "information super-
highway" refers to the concept of merging all sources of
information into a single database, retrievable from any com-
puter by users in their homes, offices, or libraries. 59
After a two-year study on the commercial potential of com-
puter networks, 60 the Clinton Administration developed the
Framework for Global Electronic Commerce ("Framework") to
discuss the commercial implications of the GII.61 The Adminis-
56. See generally id. See also infra text accompanying notes 114-24.
57. U.S. Signs Understanding with Russia on Global Information Infra-
structure, 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 32, at 1249 (Aug. 10, 1994). Signing
the agreement for the United States were the U.S. Coordinator for Communica-
tions and Information Policy, the Chairman of the Federal Communications
Commission, and the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications
and Information. See id. The Russian signatories included the Minister of Post
and Telecommunications and the Chairman of the Presidential Committee of
the Russian Federation for "Informatization" Policy. See id.
58. Id.
59. See Al Gore, Networking the Future: We Need a National "Superhigh-
way" for Computer Information, WASH. POST, July 15, 1990, at B3. Vice Presi-
dent Gore is credited with coining this phrase in Note, The Message in the
Medium: The First Amendment on the Information Superhighway, 107 HARv. L.
REV. 1062, 1062 n.3 (1994).
60. See Mark Rockwell, Clinton Policy: No Taxes, No Regs on 'Net Com-
merce,' COMMUNICATIONSWEEK, July 7, 1997, at 9, 9.
61. See FRAMEWORK, supra note 10. The interagency group which worked
on the Framework on behalf of the Administration consisted of high-level repre-
sentatives of Cabinet agencies, including the Departments of Treasury, State,
Justice, and Commerce; representatives of the Executive Office of the President
including the Council of Economic Advisors, the National Economic Council, the
National Security Council, the Office of Management and Budget, and the Of-
fice of Science and Technology Policy; the Office of the Vice-President; the U.S.
Trade Representative; and independent commissions including the Federal
Communications Commission and the Federal Trade Commission. See Walter
A. Effross, Putting the Cards Before the Purse?: Distinctions, Differences, and
Dilemmas in the Regulation of Stored Value Card Systems, 65 UMKC L. REV.
319, 333 n.43 (1997). Ira Magaziner, senior adviser to the President for policy
development, authored the Framework. See Dunlap, supra note 42, at 34.
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tration stated that "no single force embodies our electronic
transformation more than the evolving medium known as the
Internet."62 The Framework, released on July 1, 1997,63 out-
lines the U.S. plan for using the Internet to facilitate interna-
tional commerce-a plan which considers policy principles,
guidelines for international negotiation, and agency
involvement.64
In order to fully recognize the Internet's potential for pros-
perity, the Framework seeks to establish a global free-trade
zone for electronic commerce. 65 The United States "encourage [s]
all nations to refrain from imposing discriminatory taxes, tariffs,
unnecessary regulations, [and] cumbersome bureaucracies on
electronic commerce." 66 The Administration has announced its
dedication to keeping the Internet market-driven as opposed to
government-regulated, 67 clearly stating that regulation of e-
commerce will hinder the Internet's development in the global
economy.68 The Framework's ultimate goal is to create "a pre-
dictable [and] consistent legal environment . . .[in which elec-
tronic] trade and commerce . . . [may] flourish on fair and
understandable terms."69 To provide guidelines for meeting this
goal, the Framework articulates five principles.
1. "The private sector should lead.70
The Clinton administration recognizes that the private sec-
tor has driven the expansion of the Internet and that innovation,
expanded services, widespread participation, and greater effi-
ciency result from a market-driven environment. 71 Thus, where
government action is necessary, the private sector should par-
ticipate in the policy making process.7 2
62. FRAMEWORK, supra note 10, at 1.
63. See FRAMEWORK, supra note 10.
64. See generally id.
65. Remarks Announcing the Electronic Commerce Initiative, supra note 5,
at 1005.
66. See id. In his announcement of the electronic commerce initiative on
July 1, 1997, President Clinton directed United States Trade Representative
Charlene Barshefsky to "work within the... World Trade Organization, to turn
the Internet into a free-trade zone" by July 1, 1998. Id.
67. Dunlap, supra note 42, at 34.
68. See Rockwell, supra note 60, at 9.
69. Remarks Announcing the Electronic Commerce Initiative, supra note 5,
at 1005.
70. FRAMEwoRK, supra note 10, at 4.
71. See id.
72. See id.
384 [Vol. 7:375
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2. "Government should avoid undue restrictions on electronic
commerce."
7 3
The Clinton Administration recognizes that unnecessary
regulation of commercial activities will hinder development of
the electronic marketplace and has stated that "government at-
tempts to regulate are likely to be outmoded by the time they
are finally enacted, especially to the extent such regulations are
technology-specific." 74 In his announcement of the Framework,
President Clinton asked Vice President Gore to oversee the
country's progress in meeting the initiative, directed all federal
department and agency heads to review their policies to ensure
they were consistent with the Framework's principles, and in-
structed the Treasury Secretary to avoid "new discriminatory
taxes on electronic commerce."75
3. "Where governmental involvement is needed, its aim should
be to support and enforce a predictable, minimalist,
consistent, and simple legal environment for
commerce."76
In some cases, consumer protection or facilitation of elec-
tronic commerce may require government involvement.77 In
those situations, governments should establish a legal environ-
ment based on a "decentralized, contractual model of law rather
than one based on top-down regulation"78 to enhance private-
sector participation.
4. "Governments should recognize the unique qualities of the
Internet."79
Laws and regulations which may burden electronic com-
merce should be modified or eradicated.80 The government
should impose only those regulations which achieve widely-ac-
cepted goals.8 '
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See Remarks Announcing the Electronic Commerce Initiative, supra
note 5, at 1005.
76. FRAMEWORK, supra note 10, at 5.
77. See id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See id.
81. See id. For example, President Clinton directed the Commerce Secre-
tary to establish basic consumer and copyright protections for the Internet. See
Remarks Announcing the Electronic Commerce Initiative, supra note 5, at 1005.
1998] 385
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5. "Electronic commerce over the Internet should be facilitated
on a global basis."8 2
The Framework calls for the application of coherent princi-
ples across state and national borders. s3 The goal is a system
which will produce consistent results notwithstanding the juris-
diction of the particular buyer or seller.8 4
II. THE U.S. ENCRYPTION EXPORT POLICY
The Commerce Department generally requires that encryp-
tion exporters obtain a license for each encryption export; how-
ever, the Department may grant a license exception for certain
encryption items after the exporting entity passes a one-time re-
view.8 5 For example, mass-market software that uses algo-
82. FRAMEWORK, supra note 10, at 5.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See Harding, supra note 14, at 14, citing Stewart A. Baker & Michael
Hintze, United States Policy on Encryption Technology, 3 COMPUTER &
TELECOMS L. REV. 109 (1997). The "export" of encryption source code includes
"downloading, or causing the downloading of, such software to locations (includ-
ing electronic bulletin boards, Internet file transfer protocol, and World Wide
Web sites) outside the U.S., or making such software available for transfer
outside the United States, over wire, cable, radio, electromagnetic, photooptical,
photoelectric or other comparable communications facilities accessible to per-
sons outside the United States ... unless the person making the software avail-
able takes precautions adequate to prevent unauthorized transfer of such code
outside the United States." Important EAR Terms and Principles, 15 C.F.R.
§ 734.2(b)(9) (1997). "License" refers to the Bureau of Export Administration's
(BXA) authorization of an export. See Export Administration Regulations, Defi-
nition of Terms, 15 C.F.R. § 772 (1997). Licenses for encryption items are re-
quired for all destinations except Canada. See Encryption Items, 15 C.F.R.
§ 742.15(a) (1997). "License exception" refers to "[a]n authorization described
in § 740 of the EAR [allowing one] to export.., under stated conditions, items
subject to the EAR that would otherwise require a license." 15 C.F.R. § 772.
The encryption export regulations might seem to contravene the funda-
mental objective of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which
is the "reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade." General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 188. However, the export policy seems to fall under GATT's
security exception, Article XXI. Article XXI relates to fissionable materials or
the materials from which they are derived; traffic in arms, ammunition, and
implements of war; traffic in goods and materials conducted to supply a military
establishment; actions taken in time of war or other international relations
emergency; and actions taken by a country pursuant to its obligations under the
United Nations Charter "for the maintenance of international peace and secur-
ity." Id.
The President's inherent powers include his "plenary and exclusive power
... as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international
relations." United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320
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rithms with forty or fewer bits may be exempted, after a one-
time review, from the usual licensing procedures which require
key-recovery.8 6 Additionally, U.S. software manufacturers may
also receive a license exception allowing them to export highly
secure 56-bit DES8 7 or equivalent encryption products for two
years without key-recovery.88 This is known as "License Excep-
tion KMI" (Key Management Infrastructure).8 9 To qualify for
this exception, manufacturers must commit to an acceptable
plan to have keys developed and escrowed by the end of 1998.90
U.S. manufacturers may export encryption software programs of
any strength and key length as long as they provide a key to the
government.9 1 Thus, current policy prohibits U.S. software ven-
(1936). Thus, it is probably within the Administration's discretion to institute
the encryption export policy as a measure to protect the nation from terrorists
and foreign espionage.
86. See 15 C.F.R. § 742.15(a)(1). "Mass market" describes software that is
"available to the public... at retail selling points.. . [and is] designed for [user]
installation ... without substantial support by the supplier." Guidelines for
Submitting a Classification Request for a Mass Market Software Product that
Contains Encryption, 15 C.F.R. § 742, supp. 6, at (a)(1)(i)-(ii) (1997). Substan-
tial support means technical support more intensive than telephone help-line
services or basic operation training. See id. at (a)(1)(ii).
87. The Data Encryption Standard, or DES, a widely-used 56-bit encryp-
tion system, was originally developed by IBM. See Hodkowski, supra note 50,
at 227 n.82. In 1977, the U.S. government endorsed it as an official standard,
and it has been periodically recertified by the National Institute of Standards
and Technology. See id.
88. See 15 C.F.R. § 742.15(b)(3); see also Review Criteria for Exporter Key
Escrow of Key Recovery Development Plans, 15 C.F.R. § 742, supp. 7 (1997).
89. See Key Management Infrastructure, 15 C.F.R. § 740.8 (1997). See also
generally Harding, supra note 14, at 14; The Security and Freedom Through
Encryption (SAFE) Act: Hearing on H.R. 695 Before the Subcomm. on Telecom-
munications, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the House Comm. on Com-
merce, 105th Cong. 55 (1997) (statement of William A. Reinsch, Undersecretary
of Commerce for Export Administration) [hereinafter Reinsch Hearing].
90. See 15 C.F.R. § 740.8(d)(2)(i); see also 15 C.F.R. § 742.15(b)(3)(i); 15
C.F.R. § 742, supp. 7. The BXA conducts a complete case-by-case analysis of
the license application, along with any documentation submitted in support of
the application, to "determine whether the export . . .is consistent with U.S.
national security and foreign policy interests." 15 C.F.R. § 742.15(b). In addi-
tion to reviewing the item and its use, the BXA assesses the commitment of the
applicant to developing a key management infrastructure. See 15 C.F.R.
§ 742.15(b)(3)(i); 15 C.F.R. § 742, supp. 7. The BXA may consult with other
U.S. departments and agencies regarding the license application. See 15 C.F.R.
§ 742.15(b). Each grant of License Exception KMI remains valid for six months.
See 15 C.F.R. § 740.8(d)(2). An encryption exporter may request renewal of the
license exception by sending a letter to the BXA every six months, reporting
that it has progressed in meeting the milestones set forth in the exporter's plan
to provide key recovery products and services. See id.
91. See 15 C.F.R. § 740.8(b)(1); 15 C.F.R. § 742.15(b)(2). The BXA would
grant this license exemption after a single review of the plan by the Depart-
1998]
MNN . J GLOBAL TRADE
dors from exporting software with more than forty bits of en-
cryption unless the vendors provide the government with
decryption keys or commit to providing such keys within two
years.92
III. TOWARD A SOLUTION
A. PROTECTION OF DATA WITH ENCRYPTION
Because experts concede that foreign governments and ter-
rorists present a small, but growing, risk to U.S. data network
security, a prudent policy should satisfy both the commercial
need for data protection and the law enforcement need for access
to messages containing information that may assist in prevent-
ing or solving crimes. The United States' current policy, which
requires key escrow and relaxes the export ban on strong en-
cryption programs, is probably a better solution to the Internet
security problem than its opponents would like the public to
believe.
Unless data transmitted over the Global Information Infra-
structure remains secure from unauthorized access or modifica-
tion, consumers may not use the Internet for routine commercial
transactions. 93 With strong encryption, consumers can protect
data such as their credit card numbers and personal informa-
tion. Additionally, businesses will have the ability to protect
trade secrets and other valuable information. 94
President Clinton has recognized data protection as a pre-
requisite to realizing the Internet's potential as a vehicle for
commerce. He directed "all executive departments and agencies
to promote efforts domestically and internationally to make the
Internet a secure environment for commerce."95 His directive
ments of Commerce, Justice, and Defense. See Reinsch Hearing, supra note 89,
at 55.
92. See Dunlap, supra note 42, at 34. Currently, an exception to the gen-
eral policy allows banks to export secure encryption products without restric-
tion because of the especially pressing need for security in that area and its
centrality to the growth of e-commerce. See Gary G. Yerkey, Commerce Plans to
Allow Credit Card Firms, Brokerages to Export Encryption Technology, 15 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 7, at 260 (Feb. 18, 1998). A proposed rule change would
extend this exemption to a wider range of financial services institutions. See id.
93. See Merrill, supra note 25, at 136. See also supra text accompanying
notes 25-39.
94. See Merrill, supra note 25, at 136.
95. Memorandum on Electronic Commerce, supra note 8, at 1009.
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included "guaranteeing confidentiality of electronic information
to protect data from unauthorized use."96
Nevertheless, strong encryption does have its disadvan-
tages. The encrypted data may be obscured forever if the
decryption key is lost accidentally or through the actions of a
malicious employee. 97 Such a loss may be significant, depending
on the nature and value of the information. 98 For example, if a
chemist stores his secret formula for a new and potentially lu-
crative chemical in encrypted code and then loses the key, he
may never recover his ideas or the potential revenue therefrom.
Terrorists and other criminals may also use encryption to reduce
the ability of law enforcement officials to intercept and read
their communications. 9 9
B. THE POLICY'S EFFECTIVENESS
The encryption software industry has responded quickly to
the key-recovery commitment requirements of the new license
applications.10 0 During the first eight months the new regula-
tion was in effect, the Bureau of Export Administration (BXA)
received over 1,000 license applications for exports valued at
over $500 million. 10 ' As of August 4, 1997, thirty-three compa-
nies, including some of the largest software and hardware man-
ufacturers in the United States, had submitted plans which
outline how they plan to build key recovery products. 102
On October 8, 1997, the European Union (EU)-through the
European Commission (EC), which regulates trade in the fifteen
countries of the EU-announced its refusal to follow the United
States in banning certain encryption exports because such a
move "could threaten privacy and stifle the growth of electronic
commerce and.., might simply be ineffective. 10 3 The EC has
urged its member governments to take a "hands off' approach to
regulating encryption, "warning against putting a technological
96. Id.
97. See Aaron, supra note 45.
98. See FRAAEwoRK, supra note 10, at 20.
99. Id.
100. See generally Reinsch Hearing, supra note 89.
101. See id. at 56.
102. See Number of License Applications Shows Success of Encryption Pol-
icy, Reinsch Says, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 32, at 1363 (Aug. 6, 1997). As
of that time, the BXA had approved twenty-nine of the thirty-three plans and
had rejected none. See id.
103. Edmund L. Andrews, Europeans Reject U.S. Plan on Electronic Cryp-
tography, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1997, at D4.
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straitjacket on a developing market.'u0 4 However, the EC has
not balanced these economic interests against national security
interests. In contrast, the U.S. approach strikes a compromise
which satisfies both by allowing the export of any encryption
product as long as it meets the key recovery standards.105
Martin Bangemann, the European commissioner responsi-
ble for high-technology affairs, stated, "[iun technological terms
it is not possible to prevent criminals from obtaining and using
encryption techniques. Therefore, there seems little point in
preventing legal users from protecting themselves.' 06 More-
over, some assert that criminals who are aware of the potential
for decryption will simply avoid using encryption products which
permit the government to decode their messages.' 07 Yet,
criminals today realizing that the government, with authoriza-
tion, can eavesdrop on phone conversations, still use the
telephone.' 0 8
Additionally, "the U.S. computer industry [currently] has no
peer . . . [in the manufacture ofl strong encryption techno-
log[y. '"109 Australia, Israel, Canada, China, and New Zealand
boast growing encryption industries." 0 However, these govern-
ments generally enforce far more restrictive export controls than
the United States."' Moreover, none of the countries of the Or-
ganisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
have relinquished sovereign access to encrypted data.1 2 Thus,
the international encryption market is not as open as many
argue.113
C. U.S. ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS
At an industry conference on the future of information tech-
nology, a panel of U.S. experts on privacy and security sup-
ported the European line, coming to a consensus that "[tihe
104. U.S. Will Keep Pushing Net Encryption Plan, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 9,
1997, at D4.
105. See 15 C.F.R. § 740.8(b)(1) (1997) (describing how a business may qual-
ify for a license exception).
106. Slater, supra note 23.
107. See Reinsch Hearing, supra note 89, at 55.
108. See id.
109. Richard Lardner, Keys to the Code, GoVT EXECUTvE, July 1997, at 29,
29.
110. See Michael Kanellos, Is Key Recovery the Answer?, COMPUTER RE-
SELLER NEWS, Feb. 24, 1997, at 57, 57.
111. See id.
112. See id. at 58.
113. See id. at 57.
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impasse over the use and control of encryption... is eroding the
country's competitive edge [and] delaying the onset of electronic
commerce."' 14 The panelists agreed that the success of e-com-
merce depends on consumers' confidence in the system and their
belief that transactions are safe from meddlers. 115
Raymond Ozzie, creator of the popular software Lotus
Notes, told the Senate Judiciary Committee that "[ilnformation
security is critical to the integrity, stability, and health of both
corporations and governments." 1 6 He added that cryptography
is the "keystone of secure distributed systems."117 The Business
Software Alliance, an industry group in Washington, contends
that the U.S. encryption export policy places American compa-
nies at risk of losing sixty billion dollars in the global software
market 1 8 because some international software companies may
export software with encryption as strong as 128 bits.119
A recent study concluded that thirty-five countries produce
encryption products. 120 Of the more than 1,000 encryption prod-
ucts manufactured across the globe, only 435 are not produced
in the United States.' 2 ' William A. Reinsch, Undersecretary of
Commerce for Export Administration, recently stated that no
empirical evidence supported the assertion that American firms
are suffering grave losses because other countries do not restrict
the export of encryption software. 122 He stated that the Admin-
istration did not perceive an economic threat from foreign mak-
ers of encryption technology.' 23 The contention that the U.S.
computer industry has no peer in developing strong encryption
technologies 12 4 bolsters the Administration's position. The mere
fact that other countries produce encryption programs of some
strength does not prove that they can capably compete with U.S.
114. David Braun, Encryption Stalemate Threatens E-Commerce, National
Security, TEcHWmE, Oct. 9, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires
File. The panel included the following: former Federal Trade Commissioner
Christine Varney, former CIA director John Deutsch, constitutional lawyer and
free-speech advocate Floyd Abrams, and director of technology of the National
Computer Security Association Ira Winkler. See id.
115. See generally Braun, supra note 114.
116. Schatz, supra note 27, at 60.
117. Id.
118. See id.
119. See Dunlap, supra note 42, at 34.
120. See Greg Rattray, The Emerging Global Information Infrastructure and
National Security, 21 FLETCHER F. WoRLD AFF. 81, 88 (1997).
121. See id.
122. See Reinsch Hearing, supra note 89, at 56.
123. See id.
124. See Lardner, supra note 109, at 29.
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manufacturers with respect to the strong technologies addressed
in the Administration's regulations.
D. THE KEY ESCROW POLICY
At this time, the National Research Council (NRC) rejects a
key management system as untested. Instead, it encourages the
U.S. government to invest in advanced counter-encryption tech-
nologies.' 25 Its concerns include the following:
[a] lack of operational experience with how a large-scale infrastructure
for escrowed encryption would work; [a] lack of demonstrated evidence
that escrowed encryption will solve the most serious problems that law
enforcement authorities face; [and] the likely harmful impact on the
natural market development of applications made possible by new in-
formation services and technologies.
1 2 6
Additionally, the NRC expresses apprehension over the uncer-
tainty of market response to the aggressive promotion of escrow
procedures. 127
While the NRC's recommendation may provide an idealistic
vision for the future, it does not solve the government's need to
protect national interests today. A skilled hacker can break the
code for a 40-bit encryption key in about forty seconds. 128 In
contrast, in one experiment, a 56-bit key required 120 days to be
broken, even with the power of a nationwide group of network
computers. 129 Today's fastest computers would require millions
of years to descramble even stronger versions of encryption
software. 130 While the government works on reducing that time
requirement, it must have an effective means of law
enforcement.
The potential adverse impact on public safety and national
security associated with any "wait and see" approach is too great
to justify catering to the narrow interests of computer software
companies. 131 Even reducing the decoding time to days or
weeks may not be sufficient to prevent the types of crime the
125. See NRC REPORT, supra note 31, at 11-12. The NRC recommends that
"[h]igh priority should be given to research, development, and deployment of
additional technical capabilities for law enforcement and national security for
use in coping with new technological challenges." Id. at 12.
126. Id.
127. See id.
128. See Jim Kerstetter, Crypto Crew, Feds at Odds, PC WEEK, Jan. 26,
1998, at 35, 35.
129. See id.
130. See David Stipp, Techno-Hero or Public Enemy?, FORTUNE, Nov. 11,
1996, at 173, 176.
131. See Impact of Encryption Statement, supra note 41.
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export policy targets. Legally authorized wiretaps generally
provide crucial information just before a crime is to occur; simi-
larly, a nearly instantaneous ability to decode messages is nec-
essary to prevent crimes on the Internet. 13 2 Effective law
enforcement depends on electronic surveillance and search and
seizure.133 The framers of the Fourth Amendment established a
delicate balance between "[t]he right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures" and the legitimate right and necessity for
the police to have access to evidence of illegal acts. 134 Moreover,
access to a wide variety of keys through key recovery may help
the government develop its decoding capabilities by exposing it
to a broad technology base.
By requiring deposit of a decryption key in the escrow pro-
gram for all encryption software shipped internationally, the
government will have better access to the tools it needs to un-
cover covert operations affecting national security. Some argue
that, contrary to popular belief, the risk of concealed criminal
activity bears little relation to whether U.S. companies may le-
gally export strong encryption programs. 135 Criminals are, of
course, willing to break or circumvent the law to achieve their
objectives. For example, foreign criminals may use encryption
programs manufactured in foreign countries for which keys have
not been deposited. Recent evaluations suggest that the current
U.S. export controls reflect an unrealistic view of federal law's
ability to constrain actors from obtaining encryption products to
conduct strategic information attacks or conceal information
about their operations. 13 6 Over the long term, the U.S. govern-
ment may not succeed in restricting the use of encryption tech-
nology which is freely available in the United States and from
foreign companies. 1 37 However, while the government develops
the means to cope with this technological reality, a key-recovery
system remains its only currently viable alternative. 138 To allay
the burden on U.S. industry, the policy even allows an organiza-
tion to appoint an internal key recovery agent as long as the or-
132. See Greiveldinger, supra note 43, at 507.
133. See Impact of Encryption Statement, supra note 41.
134. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Impact of Encryption Statement, supra
note 41.
135. See, e.g., Dan Gillmor, Decoding Positions on Encryption Policy, CHI-
CAGO TRIB., Jan. 19, 1998, § 4 (Business & Technology), at 5.
136. See Rattray, supra note 120, at 89.
137. See David Moschella, Contrarian Thinking on Encryption Controls,
COMPUTERWORLD, Oct. 13, 1997, at 114, 114.
138. See World Wide Threats Hearing, supra note 53.
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ganization implements safeguards to "ensure the . . . agent's
structural independence from the . . . organization [and the
availability,] security, and confidentiality [of keys] ."139
Legislators in France have proposed a law guaranteeing
government access to corporate electronic data.1 40 In addition to
imposing stringent controls on the export of encryption software,
France also prohibits the domestic use of cryptography. The
proposed legislation would allow the use of encryption products
only if the manufacturer deposits a decryption key with a gov-
ernment-approved entity.'4' Those who choose not to surrender
their decryption keys would be limited to using weaker encryp-
tion software, decodable by law enforcement agencies without
keys.' 42 Gen. Jean-Louis Desvegnes, chief of France's Central
Service for the Security of Information Systems, refers to this
policy as the best way "to find a balance between national-secur-
ity interests, economic interests and the protection of personal
privacy."' 43
The U.S. government's access to decryption keys through an
escrow program would probably not significantly harm the pub-
lic's confidence in the security of electronic commerce sys-
tems.' 44 Generally, businesses themselves voluntarily maintain
a key recovery plan; in the absence of a way to decode informa-
tion, forgotten passwords, misplaced information, and other
clerical mishaps could cause significant delays or losses to the
business. 145
The fact that the government proposes an escrow program
probably alleviates some consumer concerns about the improper
use of keys. Because a third party actually maintains the keys
and uses them only at the direction of law enforcement officials,
the structure of the escrow policy allows the government and the
139. 15 C.F.R § 742, supp. 5(I)(8) (1997).
140. See Jennifer L. Schenker, French Plan for Key Encryption Alarms Cor-
porations and the EU, WALL ST. J. EuiR., Oct. 20, 1997, at 2.
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. Id.
144. However, some European businesses and government officials suspect
that the United States could use such a key system to conduct industrial espio-
nage. See Kenneth Cukier, Europe to Resist U.S. Cryptography Policy, COM-
MUNICATIONSWEEK INT'L, Sept. 22, 1997, at 1, 1. Additionally, officials at the
German Ministry of Economics fear that the U.S. key escrow approach violates
the data privacy rules in Germany and the EU. See id. The use of an interna-
tional tribunal, rather than a U.S. court, to approve the use of decryption keys
on data involving international parties might alleviate such concerns.
145. See Rockwell, supra note 60, at 87.
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third party to maintain checks on each other to assure that the
keys are not employed inappropriately. While those entrusted
with the keys may use them improperly, any violation of key-
holding obligations constitutes a violation of the EAR, and the
government may impose sanctions accordingly. 146
E. THE POLICY's FIT WITH THE UNITED STATES' OBJECTIVES
While the U.S. ban seemingly contradicts many of the objec-
tives outlined in the Framework for Global Electronic Com-
merce, it does so only to the extent necessary to protect the
nation's legitimate security interests. The United States en-
couraged other nations to refrain from imposing unnecessary
regulations and undue restrictions on electronic commerce. 147
Some argue that the ban is "unnecessary" and "undue" since
there is no empirical evidence that it is achieving its purpose.
Others criticize the Administration for implementing the ban
amid wide-spread, longstanding opposition from the U.S. com-
puter software industry,148 despite its statement that private
sector participation should be a formal part of the policy-making
process. 49 Additionally, the initial ban flatly contravened the
President's directive that the Internet should be a "secure envi-
ronment for commerce . . . guaranteeing confidentiality of elec-
tronic information to protect data from unauthorized use."'50
By initially banning the export of strong encryption products al-
together, the government curtailed the ability of foreign users to
use these programs to protect their transactions. However, a re-
cent executive order relaxed the ban, allowing the export of en-
cryption technology of any strength, as long as a key recovery
commitment accompanied its license application.' 5 ' This new
policy probably presents the best balance between national se-
146. See 15 C.F.R. § 740.8(d)(1)(i)(E) (1997).
147. See Remarks Announcing the Electronic Commerce Initiative, supra
note 5, at 1005.
148. See, e.g., Russ Mitchell, Is the FBI Reading Your E-mail?, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Oct. 13, 1997, at 49, 49 (criticism of policy generally); Michelle
Quinn, U.S. Asked to Lift Ban on Encryption, SAN FRANcTsco CHRON., Jan. 17,
1996, at B2 (objections to policy voiced by executives from companies including
Apple Computer, Silicon Graphics, and Sun Microsystems); Hiawatha Bray,
Panel Criticizes U.S. Government's Encryption Stand, BOSTON GLOBE, May 31,
1996, at 36 (reporting National Research Center's opposition); Rajiv Chan-
drasekaran, Freeh Seeks Encryption Decoding Key, WASH. POST, Sept. 4, 1997,
at El (citing protests of privacy advocates, Software Publishers Association,
and Business Software Alliance).
149. See FRAMEwoRK, supra note 10, at 4.
150. Memorandum on Electronic Commerce, supra note 8, at 1009.
151. See 15 C.F.R. § 740.8; see also Exec. Order No. 13,026 supra note 44.
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curity, privacy, and economic interests in view of where encryp-
tion technology stands today and law enforcement's limited
ability to cope with the dangers it presents.
F. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
In the United States, some have suggested that the notion
that transactions can be rendered illegal because authorities
cannot readily access them clearly violates several aspects of the
Bill of Rights.1 5 2 On August 26, 1997, a federal judge in San
Francisco held the current federal rules limiting encryption ex-
ports unconstitutional. 153 Daniel Bernstein, a math professor at
the University of Illinois, sued the government in 1995, arguing
that federal controls on encryption violated his First Amend-
ment rights to free speech.1 5 4 U.S. District Court Judge Marilyn
Hall Patel approved an injunction, forbidding the government
from prosecuting Bernstein for posting his encryption software
on the Internet. 5 5 The case is currently on appeal.1 5
6
Judge Patel wrote that "a licensing scheme with a content-
neutral purpose must still contain adequate procedural safe-
guards in order to be constitutional.'15 7 The government "may
not condition ... speech on obtaining a license or permit from a
government official in that official's boundless discretion. 15 8
The court classified computer source code as speech, thus grant-
ing encryption software First Amendment protection.1 5 9 The
court noted that although the EAR provides that license applica-
tions will be resolved or referred to the President within ninety
days, there is no time limit on an application that has been re-
ferred to the President. 160 Moreover, if the BXA rejects an ap-
plication, the agency provides an internal appeals process which
requires only that it must render a decision "within a reasonable
time."16 ' Most importantly, there are no standards for decision;
the EAR reviews license applications on a "case-by-case basis"
152. See, e.g., Steve Steinke, The Latest on Crypto Regulation, NETWORK
MAG., Nov. 1997, at 16, 18.
153. See Bernstein v. United States Dep't of State, 974 F. Supp. 1288 (N.D.
Cal. 1997).
154. See id. at 1292.
155. See id. at 1310-11.
156. See Leibowitz, supra note 28, at Al.
157. Bernstein, 974 F. Supp. at 1307.
158. Id. at 1304 (citing Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750,
764 (1988)) (emphasis in original).
159. See id. at 1303.
160. See id. at 1308.
161. Id.
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and apparently does not curtail agency discretion. 162 As the reg-
ulations stand, the court held that they constitute an unconsti-
tutional prior restraint on speech. 163
The court concluded that the President possesses the au-
thority to maintain the export regulations based on his broad
discretion under the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act.164 It directed its objections to the administrative procedures
outlined in the regulations, rather than their substantive effect.
Therefore, although a federal court held the encryption export
regulations unconstitutional, the Administration may easily
cure their defects without affecting its underlying policy.
IV. CONCLUSION
The U.S. encryption restrictions do not reach criminals who
operate solely in the United States and use encryption technolo-
gies to conceal their activities. The limitations apply exclusively
to exports, evidencing the government's commitment to acting
only to the extent necessary to protect national security inter-
ests from foreign-based criminals such as terrorists.
A policy of allowing encryption technology exports when ac-
companied by key recovery presents the best-balanced position
for the government at this time. While the NRC is very ambi-
tious in its recommendation that the government direct its re-
sources to the development of advanced counter-encryption
technologies, that stance does not solve the government's need
to protect national security interests today. The government
must have a means of law enforcement to use while it works on
meeting the NRC's goals.
The current U.S. policy, while not ideal, may be the most
well-balanced formulation for the present. The policy does not
seek to expand the powers of law enforcement or reduce the pri-
vacy protection of individuals. Its intent is to maintain, in the
face of technological advances, the legal tools which Congress
and the Constitution have determined are necessary for safe-
guarding the nation's security interests.
162. See id. (citing 15 C.F.R. § 742.15(b) (1997)).
163. See id. at 1307-08.
164. See id. at 1298-1303.
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